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Authors' Abstract
We consider decidability and expressiveness issues for two rst-order logics of probability. In one, the probability is on possible worlds, while in the other, it is on the domain. It turns out that in both cases it takes very little to make reasoning about probability highly undecidable. We show that when the probability is on the domain, if the language contains only unary predicates then the validity problem is decidable. However, if the language contains even one binary predicate, the validity problem is 2 1 complete, as hard as elementary analysis with free predicate and function symbols. With equality in the language, even with no other symbol, the validity problem is at least as hard as that for elementary analysis, 1 1 hard. Thus, the logic cannot be axiomatized in either case. When we put the probability on the set of possible worlds, the validity problem is 2 1 complete with as little as one unary predicate in the language, even without equality. With equality, we get 1 1 hardness with only a constant symbol. We then turn our attention to an analysis of what causes this overwhelming complexity. For example, we show that if we require rational probabilities then we drop from
Introduction
Reasoning about probability is crucial in many contexts, from analyzing probabilistic programs to reasoning about uncertainty in expert systems. Especially in the context of expert systems, there is a great deal of interest in nding a language appropriate for carrying out such reasoning, and then automating it. Recently there has been much research in the area of probabilistic reasoning about propositional statements: it is possible to provide straightforward syntax and semantics for rich propositional languages for reasoning about probability, with relatively tractable decision procedures and complete axiomatizations FHM90, GKP88, Nil86] .
Propositional logic is often not expressive enough to capture many important situations; we would like to have the machinery of rst-order logic, with functions, predicates, and quanti cation. It thus becomes of interest to extend the results we have for the propositional case to the rst-order case. Of course, a language for reasoning about probability ought to have easily comprehensible syntax and semantics. Ideally, the validity problem would be not much worse than that for rst-order logic, and we would have a complete axiomatization that could provide some guidance for automating the reasoning process.
Unfortunately, even providing semantics for a rst-order logic of probabilities is not completely straightforward. As pointed out by Bacchus Bac88, Bac90] , the possible-worlds semantics used in Nil86] and (for the propositional case) in FHM90] is not expressive enough. To understand the problem, consider the two statements \The probability that Tweety ies is greater than .9" and \The probability that a randomly chosen bird ies is greater than .9".
We can capture the rst sentence using the possible worlds approach in a straightforward way. We consider a number of possible worlds. Tweety ies in some of them, but not in others. (Thus, the predicate Fly has di erent extensions in di erent possible worlds.) We put a probability on the space of possible worlds, and then say that the probability that Tweety ies is greater than .9 exactly if the set of worlds where Fly(Tweety) holds has probability greater than .9. This approach will not serve to capture the statistical information inherent in the second statement. In particular, it does not correspond to saying that the set of worlds where the statement 8x(Bird(x) ) Fly(x)) holds has probability greater than :9. We might believe that 90% of all birds y without believing that there is any possible world where all birds y. Bacchus shows that other attempts to capture the second statement using a possible-worlds approach su er from similar aws.
Intuitively, the rst statement suggests the existence of a number of possible worlds, with a probability on the set of worlds, while the second seems to assume only one possible world (the \real" world), with a probability on the domain (so that if we pick a bird at random from the domain, it will y with probability greater than :9). In Hal90], this situation is analyzed in detail, and syntax and semantics are provided for two logics, one of which assumes a probability on the domain, while the other one assumes a probability on the possible worlds.
In this paper, we consider the complexity of the validity problem for these logics, and investigate how formulas of the rst can be used to capture ideas of the second, and vice versa.
For classical predicate calculus, it is known that the validity problem is decidable if the language has only unary predicates, but the validity problem is undecidable with even one binary predicate DG79, Lew79] . However, no matter what predicates and functions we allow in the language, the validity problem is recursively enumerable; moreover, there is a well-known complete axiomatization for rst-order logic End72]. We show that the validity problem with just unary predicates is decidable for the rst logic of probability. (A complete axiomatization is provided in Hal90].) However, once we add even one binary predicate, the logic becomes wildly undecidable, in fact complete for 2 1 . This is the complexity of the validity problem for elementary analysis with free predicate and function symbols; it is even harder than the complexity of elementary analysis (or equivalently, second-order arithmetic with set variables) which is 1 1 (see Rog67, Hin78] for details). Of course, it follows that there cannot be a complete axiomatization for the language.
The situation is even worse if we have equality. For rst-order logic with equality, the validity problem with only unary predicates in the language is still decidable DG79]. However, with equality and probability in the picture, we can get 1 1 hardness without any predicates and functions in the language at all! In the case of the second logic, where the probability is over the possible worlds, we get 2 1 completeness as soon as we have even one unary predicate. If equality is included, we get 1 1 hardness as long as there is at least one constant symbol.
Roughly speaking, our undecidability results say that as long as is \su ciently rich", the validity problem for rst-order reasoning about prob-ability is wildly undecidable. Exactly which richness condition is required for and how undecidable the logic is depends on whether we are considering probability on the domain or on possible worlds, and whether or not equality is in the language. The situation is summarized in the table below, where only lower bounds on complexity are stated; L 1 ( ) and Table 1 : Undecidability for rst-order logics of probability
These results stand in contrast to those of Bacchus Bac90], who provides a complete axiomatization for a logic with essentially the same syntax as our rst logic, with probability on the domain. What allows Bacchus to obtain his result (which in particular shows that the validity problem for his language is semi-decidable) is that he allows nonstandard probability functions, which are only required to be nitely additive (rather than countably additive) and he allows probabilities to take values in arbitrary ordered elds.
Bacchus's result motivates us to consider exactly what it is that makes reasoning about probability so highly intractable. For example, it turns out that all of our undecidability results go through without change if we allow probabilities to be nitely additive. We can get 1 1 hardness results without having multiplication in the language or quanti cation over the reals. In fact, we already get 1 1 hardness if we restrict probabilities to taking rational values. There is some good news in this bleak picture: if we restrict attention to domains of bounded size (which arise frequently in AI applications), then both logics are decidable.
Finally, we consider the issue of the expressive power of these two logics. Although the logics capture very di erent intuitions about probability, we show that in a precise sense they are equally expressive. There exists a translation taking a structure M for the rst logic to a structure M 0 for the second, and taking a formula ' of the rst logic to a formula ' 0 of the second such that M j = ' i M 0 j = ' 0 . Similar results hold in translating from the second logic to the rst.
Although work relating rst-order logic and probability goes back to Carnap Car50], there has been relatively little work on providing formal rstorder logics for reasoning about probability. Besides the work of Bacchus mentioned above, Gaifman Gai60, Gai64] considered the problem of associating probabilities with classical rst-order statements (which, as pointed out in Bac88], essentially corresponds to putting probabilities on possible worlds); Hoover Hoo78] considered questions related to such a logic. Lo s and Fenstad studied this problem as well, but allowed values for free variables to be chosen according to a probability on the domain Lo s63, Fen67]. Gaifman and Snir GS82] used a logic where probabilities are put on sentences to investigate issues related to randomness. Keisler Kei85] investigated an in nitary logic with a measure on the domain, and obtained completeness and compactness results. Feldman and Harel FH84, Fel84] considered a probabilistic dynamic logic, which extends rst-order dynamic logic by adding probability. There are commonalities between the programfree fragment of Feldman and Harel's logic and our logics, but since their interest is in reasoning about probabilistic programs, their formalism is signi cantly more complex than ours, and they focus on proving that their logic is complete relative to its program-free fragment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next three sections, we review the syntax and semantics of the two logics (using material taken from Hal90]) and then some facts about the arithmetical and the analytical hierarchies. In Section 5, we discuss our decidability and undecidability results. We consider expressiveness issues in Section 6.
Probabilities on the domain
We assume that we have a rst-order language for reasoning about some domain. We take this language to consist of a collection of predicate symbols and function symbols of various arities. (As usual, we can identify constant symbols with function symbols of arity 0.) Given a formula ' in the logic, we also allow formulas such as w x (') 1=2, which can be interpreted as \the probability that a random x in the domain satis es ' is greater than or equal to 1/2". We actually extend this to allow arbitrary sequences of distinct variables in the subscript. To understand the intuition behind this, suppose the formula Son(x; y) says that x is the son of y. Now consider the three terms w x (Son(x; y)), w y (Son(x; y)), and w hx;yi (Son(x; y)). The rst describes the probability that a random x is the son of y; the second describes the probability that x is the son of a random y; the third describes the probability that a random pair (x; y) will have the property that x is the son of y.
We formalize these ideas by using a two-sorted language. The rst sort consists of the function symbols and predicate symbols in , together with a countable family of object variables x o ; y o ; : : : : The second sort consists of the constant symbols 0 and 1, the binary function symbols + and , the binary relation symbols > and =, and a countable family of eld variables x f ; y f ; : : :. ( We drop the superscripts on the variables when it is clear from context of what sort they are.) We form object terms, which range over the domain of the rst-order language, by starting with object variables and closing o under function application, so that if f is an n-ary function symbol in and t 1 ; : : :; t n are object terms, then f(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) is an object term. We then de ne formulas and eld terms simultaneously; eld terms range over the reals (or, later sub elds of the reals). Informally, eld terms are formed by starting with 0, 1, and probability terms of the form wx('), where ' is a formula, and closing o under + and , so that t 1 + t 2 and t 1 t 2 are eld terms if t 1 and t 2 are. We form formulas in the standard way. We start with atomic formulas: if P is an n-ary predicate symbol in , and t 1 ; : : :; t n are object terms, then P(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) is an atomic formula, while if t 1 and t 2 are eld terms then t 1 = t 2 and t 1 > t 2 are atomic formulas. We also consider the situation where there is an equality symbol for object terms; in this case, if t 1 and t 2 are object terms, then t 1 = t 2 is also an atomic formula. We then close o under conjunction, negation, and universal quanti cation, so that if ' 1 and ' 2 are formulas and x is a ( eld or object) variable, then ' 1^'2 , :' 1 , and 8x' 1 are also formulas. A formal de nition of eld terms and formulas can be given by induction on the depth of nesting of expressions of the form wx(') that appear in eld terms; we omit details here. We call the resulting language L 1 ( ); if it includes equality between object terms, we call it L = 1 ( ).
We de ne _, ), and 9 in terms of^, :, and 8 as usual. In addition, if t 1 and t 2 are two eld terms, we use other standard abbreviations, such as t 1 t 2 for (t 1 > t 2 ) _ (t 1 = t 2 ) and t 1 1=2 for (1 + 1) t 1 1.
The only di erences between our syntax and that of Bacchus is that we write wx(') rather than ']x, and, for simplicity, we do not consider what Bacchus calls measuring functions (functions which map object terms into eld terms), and the only eld functions we allow are + and . The language is still quite rich, allowing us to express conditional probabilities, notions of independence, and statistical notions; we refer the reader to Bac90] for examples.
We de ne a type 1 probability structure over to be a tuple (D; ; ), where D is a domain, assigns to the predicate and function symbols in predicates and functions of the right arity over D, and is a discrete probability function on D. That 
Probabilities on possible worlds
The syntax for a logic for reasoning about possible worlds is essentially the same as the syntax used in the previous section. Starting with a set of predicate and function symbols, we form more complicated formulas and terms as before, except that instead of allowing probability terms of the form wx('), wherex is some vector of distinct object variables, we only allow probability terms of the form w('), interpreted as \the probability of '". Since we are no longer going to put a probability distribution on the domain, it does not make sense to talk about the probability that a random choice forx will satisfy '. It does make sense to talk about the probability of ', though: this will be the probability of the set of possible worlds where ' is true. We call the resulting language L 2 ( ); if it includes equality between object terms, we call it L = 2 ( ).
More formally, a type 2 probability structure over is a tuple (D; S; ; ), where D is a domain, S is a set of states or possible worlds, (s) assigns to the predicate and function symbols in predicates and functions of the right arity over D for each state s 2 S, and is a discrete probability function on S. Thus, each state s 2 S can be viewed as a rst-order structure. All these structures have a common domain, namely D, but they may di er in the interpretations they assign to the function and predicate symbols in . Roughly speaking, in order to evaluate the eld term w('), we x an assignment v of values in D to the free variables of ', and then compute the probability of the set of states where ' is true under assignment v. Note the key di erence between type 1 and type 2 probability structures: in type 1 probability structures, the probability is taken over the domain D, while in type 2 probability structures, the probability is taken over the set S of states.
Given a type 2 probability structure M, a state s, and valuation v, we can associate with every object (resp. eld) term t an element t] (M;s;v) of D (resp. IR), and with every formula ' a truth value, writing (M; s; v) j = ' if the value true is associated with ' by (M; s; v). We now need the state on the left-hand side of j = to provide interpretations for the predicate and function symbols.
(Recall that they might have di erent interpretations in each state.) Again, we just give a few clauses of the de nition here, to indicate the similarities and di erences between type 1 and type 2 probability structures: 
Some complexity classes
In our proofs, we show that, in most cases, both logics of probability are expressive enough to allow systems of arithmetic and analysis to be encoded. Hence, the validity problems for our logics are highly undecidable; in particular, the logics are not axiomatizable. In this section, we give de nitions of classes such as 1 that come into the study of variants of our logics, and we describe properties of these classes that will be important in our proofs. Our treatment here is quite sketchy; the interested reader should consult the books by Rogers n formulas preceded by universal quantiers. Generally, in an expression such as i n , the superscript tells us the order of the parameters (if the superscript is i, we have parameters of order i+1) and the subscript tells us the type of quanti cation that we are allowed over these parameters.
For each of these classes of formulas, there is a corresponding set of sets of natural numbers and a corresponding set of problems that can be de ned with the formulas of that class. For example, the set S is a We identify each class of formulas with a corresponding class of codes for them, in some standard encoding; the truth problem for a given class is the problem of deciding whether a sentence in that class is true, or more precisely whether the code for the sentence is a member of the set of codes for true sentences. It is easy to see that the truth problem for is 1 1 hard, and can be written as the recursive union of 1 n sets. Thus, although the set is not in 1 1 , in some sense it is just beyond. Similarly, we can obtain the notion of 0 1 completeness. There are actually many equivalent ways of de ning these complexity classes. In particular, there are many equivalent ways to present higherorder quanti cation. Above, we have used variables that range over sets of numbers and sets of sets of numbers. Through standard coding techniques it is simple to show that we could also have quanti ed over predicates and functions over the naturals, instead of over sets of natural numbers, and then over functionals (functions from functions to functions), instead of over sets of sets. Notice that it does not matter whether the functions in question return naturals, reals, or sets of naturals. For example, a function f that takes a natural n and returns a real f(n) is equivalent to a function that takes two naturals n and k and returns the k th bit of the binary expansion of f(n).
Another way to arrive at the same de nitions is by replacing sets of natural numbers with real numbers (and, correspondingly, sets of sets of natural numbers with sets of real numbers). In this approach, naturals and reals are kept separate, in the sense that variables that range over all reals are distinguished from those that range over natural numbers. On the other hand, it is permitted to add and to multiply reals, and it is also permitted to say that a real equals a natural. In this fashion, we obtain systems of analysis. In particular, the system known as elementary analysis is obtained as the analogue of second-order arithmetic with set variables, and as a matter of fact elementary analysis and second-order arithmetic with set variables have exactly the same power.
1
Yet another variant consists in not including multiplication of natural numbers in the language. By the time we have universal quanti cation over sets of natural numbers (as we do once we are at the 1 1 level), having multiplication in the language does not add expressive power, since we can de ne the multiplication relation. (The idea is to rst de ne the set of perfect squares using a universal second-order quanti er and addition (as in Hal91]), and then de ne multiplication exploiting the identity (m+n)
In Rogers' description of analysis, the nonnegative reals are the only ones considered. We typically work with all reals, but this is only a super cial di erence. Trivially, a system with all reals is at least as expressive as one with the nonnegative reals (since we can say that a real is nonnegative). Conversely, any statement about the reals can be transformed into a statement about nonnegative reals. The idea is to encode a real as a pair of nonnegative reals; we omit details here. 
Decidability and undecidability results
In this section we consider the complexity of the validity problem. The structures we are interested in contain the reals with addition and multiplication. The rst-order theory of the reals with addition and multiplication is well known to be equivalent to the theory of real closed elds and to be decidable Tar55]. (In fact, it is decidable in exponential space, by results of BOKR86].) This might give us some hope that our languages might have relatively tractable decision procedures. This hope is realized in one special case, namely, for L 1 ( ) with unary predicates (see Theorem 5.1 below). However, as we mentioned in the introduction, the validity problem is highly undecidable in general. Some intuition behind this might stem from the observation that, although the theory of the reals with addition and multiplication is decidable, once we have some additional structure, such as a predicate de ning the natural numbers (so that we can e ectively quantify over both the reals and the naturals), we then get to 1 1 , the level of second-order arithmetic. As our results below show, once we have a binary predicate in the language, for example, we can do enough encoding to get us to this level and beyond, using the probability functions.
We start with L 1 ( ) and type 1 structures. It is well known that the validity problem for rst-order logic where the language has no function symbols (other than constants) and only unary predicates is decidable DG79]. Thus, the following result might not seem too surprising.
Theorem 5.1: If consists only of unary predicates, then the validity problem for L 1 ( ) with respect to type 1 probability structures is decidable. Proof: As shown in Hal90, Theorem 5.7, Claim 2], if consists of monadic predicates only and there is no equality, for any closed formula ' we can e ectively nd closed formulas ' 1 and ' 2 such that:
' is valid i both ' 1 and ' 2 are valid, ' 1 is a pure rst-order formula over (and so is formed from the symbols in and object variables, using rst-order quanti cation), and ' 2 is a formula in the language of real closed elds (and so is formed from 0, 1, +, , >, =, and eld variables, using rst-order quanti cation over eld variables).
The result now follows from the decidability of the theory of real closed elds and the decidability of rst-order logic with only unary predicates. Once we allow even one binary predicate into , rst-order logic becomes undecidable DG79], although it is recursively enumerable (no matter how rich is), and has an elegant complete axiomatization End72]. Unfortunately, the situation gets much worse once we allow reasoning about probabilities. As we mentioned above, the probability functions allow us to do su cient encoding to get a high degree of undecidability. In fact, as soon as we allow even one binary predicate into the language, the validity problem becomes 2 1 complete.
Theorem 5.2: If contains at least one predicate of arity greater than or equal to two, then the validity problem for L 1 ( ) with respect to type 1 probability structures is 2 1 complete.
Proof: We rst prove the lower bound. Suppose we have a binary predicate B in . Consider an arbitrary 2 1 sentence . We show how to construct a formula 0 in L 1 (fBg) such that is true i 0 is satis able. This will prove the lower bound.
Intuitively, we are going to force the domain to be the disjoint sum of the natural numbers with its power set. We rst separate the domain into two components, the elements x such that B(x; x), and those such that :B(x; x). Intuitively, we can think of elements in the rst component (or, more accurately, equivalence classes of elements in the rst component) as representing the natural numbers, while those in the second represent sets of natural numbers. We also use elements in the rst component to represent sets of sets of natural numbers. In addition, if x is in the rst component and y is in the second, then B(x; y) holds exactly if the number represented by (the equivalence class of) x is in the set represented by y, while B(y; x) holds if the set represented by y is in the set of sets represented by x.
Let 1 be a formula that forces B to be an equivalence relation on the rst component:
The formula 2 says that if an element x in the rst component is related to y via B, then so are all the other elements in x's equivalence class: The formula 3 requires that there be equivalence classes with probabilities 1=2, 1=4, 1=8, : : : in the rst component of the domain. Since the sum of the probabilities of these equivalence classes is 1, these can be the only equivalence classes of positive probability in the domain. It follows that all the elements of positive probability in the domain are in the rst component. We would now like to argue that since every set of natural numbers can be associated in an obvious way with a binary representation of a real number, it follows that every set of natural numbers can be represented by an element in the second component. There is a slight technical problem with this argument: a given real number may represent two di erent sets of natural numbers. For example, the singleton set f0g is represented by :1, and its complement is represented by :01111 : : :, but both of these are representations of the real number 1=2. This problem is easily seen to occur only if the binary representation of a set has either nitely many 0's or nitely many 1's (that is, if the set is either nite or co nite). Thus, we add a formula that \says" that every nite and co nite set is represented. We proceed as follows. If y is an element of the second component, the formula 1 (y) = def 9x(B(x; x)^B(x; y))9 r > 0(8x(B(x; x)^w z (B(z; x)) < r ) :B(x; y))) expresses that y represents a nonempty and nite set. Note that the way we say that y represents a nite set is to say that it does not contain any representations of natural numbers with probability greater than some xed r > 0. Similarly, the formula 2 (y) = def 9x(B(x; x)^:B(x; y))9 r > 0(8x(B(x; x)^w z (B(z; x)) < r ) B(x; y))) expresses that the complement of the set represented by y is nonempty and nite. If y 0 is also an element of the second component, the formula Thus, the formula 6 says if y is an element of the second component that represents a nite or co nite set, then there is another element y 0 in the second component that represents a di erent set, although both y and y 0 encode the same real number. (We except from this the empty set and the set of all numbers, since they are the only sets encoding 0 and 1, respectively.)
It follows that y 0 must represent the appropriate co nite (resp. nite) set.
The formulas 5 and 6 now guarantee that every set of natural numbers is represented by some element in the second component and every element in the second component represents some set of natural numbers.
In the 2 1 sentence we wish to capture, there will also be existential quanti cation over sets of sets of natural numbers. Since the third-order quanti ers are existential and their number is nite, we have to represent a nite number of sets of sets, those needed for instantiating the third-order quanti ed variables. We represent these sets of sets of natural numbers by elements of the rst component. As we mentioned above, we again use B to encode the membership relation. Thus, if y is in the second component and x is in the rst component, we take B(y; x) to hold if the set of natural numbers represented by y is an element of the set of sets represented by x.
We cannot force there to be an element of the rst component representing each possible set of sets of natural numbers; fortunately, we don't need to do this. (We would need to do this if we considered, say, Notice that the 2 above actually expressed a similar fact: that if x and x 0 represent the same number then they belong to the same sets of natural numbers.
We next provide a translation ' ! ' t from 2 1 formulas to formulas in L 1 (fBg), by induction on the structure of ', starting with atomic formulas.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the atomic formulas have one of the forms: x = 0, x = 1, x + x 0 = y, x 2 X, and X 2 X. (As we remarked earlier, we can assume without loss of generality that there is no multiplication in ; we can clearly rewrite to get rid of more complicated atomic formulas such as x + x 0 = y + y 0 , etc.) In the translation, we treat all the variables x; X; X as object variables, and assume that the basic connectives in formulas are^, :, and 9. w z (B(z; y)) (x 2 X) t = B(x; x)^:B(X; X)^B(x; X) (X 2 X) t = :B(X; X)^B(X ; X)^B(X; X) (' 1^'2 ) t = ' t 1^' t 2 (:') t = :(' t ) (9x') t = 9x(B(x; x)^' t ) (9X') t = 9X(:B(X; X)^' t ) (9X ') t = 9X(B(X; X)^' t ) Finally, let 0 be the conjunction of t and the formulas 1 ; : : :; 7 . We claim that is true i t is satis able.
This argument shows that the satis ability problem for L 1 (B) is 2 1 hard, and hence that the validity problem is 2 1 hard. Next, we discuss the 2 1 upper bound. We prove that the satis ability problem is 2 1 , using two basic ideas. The rst idea is that we need to consider only models which are not \too large"|at most the cardinality of the continuum; we exploit the discreteness of the probability distribution to show this. The second idea is that, with a little higher-order quanti cation, we can de ne when a function is a probability function and when a formula holds with a given probability. Therefore, we can transform a formula in the logic of probability into a classical (higher-order) formula. Thus, the satis ability problem is reduced to a classical one. We sketch the proof here, leaving many details to the reader.
Consider a sentence ' in L 1 ( ), Without loss of generality, we assume that the probability operator occurs only in formulas of the form wỹ(') = x f . Our rst step is to transform ' to a formula ' 0 in a richer one-sorted language that does not involve probability terms. In the richer language we have new unary predicate symbols isD, isR, isN, functions h 1 , : : :, h k , 1 , : : :, k from the natural numbers to the reals, and binary predicates Elem 1 , : : :, Elem k on the natural numbers, where k is the length of the longest vector x that occurs in a subterm wx(' 0 ) of '. Intuitively, isD is true for elements that are meant to represent elements of the object domain, isR is true for the reals, and isN is true for the natural numbers (which, of course, are intended to be a subset of the reals). The object domain is no longer assumed to be disjoint from the reals, and in fact will be a subset of the reals in the structure constructed in this proof. We explain the role of the h i 's below.
Transforming ' to a formula in a one-sorted language uses standard techniques from logic; we simply relativize quanti cation over the object domain and reals by using isD and isR. Further transforming ' so that it does not involve probability terms requires more e ort. Here is where the functions h i , i and the predicates Elem i come in. Since there are only countably many elements in the domain that can have positive probability (thanks to our assumption that the probability is discrete), we essentially assume that these elements are in fact all natural numbers. (In particular,
we do not assume that isD and isN represent disjoint sets.) We then force i to assign probability to i-tuples and h i to assign probability to nite sets of i-tuples in a consistent way. We discuss the case of h 1 and 1 here|the other ones follow a similar pattern.
Although h 1 is a function from the natural numbers to the reals, we really want to view it as a function from nite sets of natural numbers to the reals. Intuitively, h 1 (n) is the probability of the set represented by n.
There are many ways to encode a nite set of natural numbers as a natural number. We use the following. Let (m; n) = 1 2 (m 2 + 2mn + n 2 + 3m + n). As observed in Rog67], is a recursive one-one mapping of IN IN onto IN. We take 0 to be an encoding of the empty set, and take (m; n) to be the union of fmg and the set encoded by n.
We take Elem 1 (m; n) to hold exactly if m is a member of the set represented by n under this encoding. The following two formulas force Elem 1 to have the required properties: 8m:Elem 1 (m; 0) 8m; n Elem 1 (m; n) , isN(m)^isN(n)9 k 1 ; k 2 (isN(k 1 )^isN(k 2 )^n = (k 1 ; k 2 )^(m = k 1 _ Elem 1 (m; k 2 ))] The following four formulas guarantee that h 1 and 1 \work right". The rst one guarantees that the probability of the empty set is 0, while the second one deals with adding an element to a set. The other two guarantee that probabilities sum up to 1. h 1 (0) = 0 8m; n(isN(m)^isN(n)^:Elem 1 (m; n) ) h 1 ( (m; n)) = 1 (m) + h 1 (n)) 8m; n(isN(m)^isN(n)^Elem 1 (m; n) ) h 1 ( (m; n)) = h 1 (n)) 8k(isN(k) ) 9n(isN(n)^h 1 (n) 1 ? 1=k)) 8n(isN(n) ) h 1 (n) 1^ 1 (n) 0) With all these de nitions in hand, it is now easy to replace all occurrences of formulas such as wỹ( ) = r. Suppose theỹ actually consists of just the variable y. We then replace the formula w y ( ) = r by: 8k9n 1 ; n 2 8m 1 ; m 2 ((Elem 1 (m 1 ; n 1 ) ) (m 1 ))( Elem 1 (m 2 ; n 2 ) ) : (m 2 ))ĥ 1 (n 1 ) > r ? 1=k^h 1 (n 2 ) > 1 ? r ? 1=k): Intuitively, this formula says we can nd nite subsets n 1 and n 2 of the set of elements that satisfy and : , respectively, such that the probability of n 1 is arbitrarily close to r and the probability of n 2 is arbitrarily close to 1 ? r. Similar ideas work (using h i and Elem i ) ifỹ is a vector of length i.
Let ' 0 be the formula that results by transforming ' as described above and conjoining the axioms that describe h 1 , : : :, h k , 1 , : : :, k , Elem 1 , : : :, Elem k . We leave it to the reader to check that ' is satis able i ' 0 is satis able in an appropriate structure: one that interprets isR as the reals, isN as the natural numbers (a subset of the reals), and interprets 0, 1, +, and < in the standard way over the reals. Notice that if we can nd an appropriate structure M satisfying ' 0 , we can take the Skolem hull of IR CK90] in M to nd an appropriate structure M 0 satisfying ' 0 such that M 0 has the cardinality of IR. It is now straightforward to prove that ' 0 is satis able in an appropriate structure i ' 0 is satis able in an appropriate structure with domain IR, where isD is interpreted as a subset of IR. (The proof is by induction on the structure of ' 0 , using the fact that isD only occurs when it is necessary to relativize quanti cations.) showing that we can de ne a predicate isN such that isN(r) holds exactly if r is a natural number. We do this by using a slightly di erent encoding of natural numbers than that used in Theorem 5.2. We encode the natural number n by a domain element with probability 1=(n + 1)(n + 2). Our rst step is to force domain elements with this probability to exist. This is the job of 1 and 2 below: 1 = def 9z w y (y = z) = 1=2]; 2 = def 8r 0 (9x(r + 1)(r + 2)(w y (y = x)) = 1) ) (9x 0 (r + 2)(r + 3)(w y (y = x 0 )) = 1)]: In 1 we think of z as 0, and in 2 we think of x 0 as the successor of x. Since 1 X n=0 1 (n + 1)(n + 2) = 1; the domain elements with positive probability, equipped with this 0 and this successor relation, are isomorphic to the standard natural numbers. Furthermore, the only possible positive probabilities for domain elements are of the form 1=(n+1)(n+2), where n is a natural number. Thus, we can pick out the reals which are natural numbers: these are exactly the r such that 9x (r + 1)(r + 2)(w y (y = x)) = 1]: This immediately gives us a predicate isN to test for whether a number is a natural number. It is now straightforward to translate a formula ' in the language of elementary analysis to an equisatis able formula ' 0 of L = 1 (;). We simply replace quanti cation over the natural numbers by quanti cation over the reals, relativized to these reals that satisfy isN. This Proof: Suppose ' is a satis able formula in L = 1 ( ). Suppose that it is satis ed in some structure M. We show that ' is in fact satis ed in some countable substructure M 0 of M. The proof uses similar techniques to that showing that if a formula of rst-order logic with only unary predicates is satis ed in some structure M, then it is satis ed in a nite substructure of M DG79]. Let P 1 (x); : : :; P m (x) be the unary predicates in ' that appear in ', and let a 1 ; : : :; a n be the constant symbols that appear in '. Let an atom over P 1 ; : : :; P m be a formula of the form Q 1 (x)^: : :^Q m (x), where each Q i is either P i or :P i . Notice that there are 2 m such atoms; Thus, we have proved that we can restrict attention to countable structures. We can now use the techniques of the upper-bound proof for the general case, to show that the original formula ' is satis able if and only if there exist predicates isD, P 1 , : : :, P m over the naturals, and functions 1 , : : :, k , h 1 , : : :, h k from the naturals to the reals, and predicates Elem 1 , : : :, Elem k on the natural numbers such that the formula ' 0 holds. Here all second-order quanti ers range over operations on naturals; after this pre x, ' 0 itself contains only rst-order quanti ers over naturals and reals.
We conclude that the satis ability problem is in 1 1 , and hence that the validity problem is in 1 1 . As we remarked in the introduction, Bacchus gives a complete axiomatization for a logic syntactically similar to ours, thus showing that the validity problem is semi-decidable in his semantics. The reason for this di erence is that Bacchus allows nonstandard probability functions, which are required only to be nitely additive and can take values in arbitrary ordered elds. The proofs above require only the probability function to be nitely additive. Thus, the key reason that Bacchus is able to obtain a complete axiomatization is that he allows probabilities to take values in arbitrary ordered elds. As observed by Gaifman, Bacchus' result can perhaps best be understood by observing that ordered elds can be characterized by a nite collection of rst-order axioms, as can nite additivity (while countable additivity cannot). Using this observation, it can be shown that Bacchus' language can be translated into rst-order logic. From this, axiomatizability follows from the axiomatizability of rst-order logic.
Validity is intractable for real-valued probabilities, as we have shown; it is also intractable for other elds, such as the rationals: Proof: In order to prove Theorem 5.5, we need to review some material from Hal91]. Recall that the language for Presburger arithmetic consists of the constants 0, 1, and the function symbol +, interpreted over the natural numbers. Thus, Presburger arithmetic is the theory of arithmetic without multiplication. The validity problem of Presburger arithmetic is well known to be decidable End72]. However, once we add a free unary predicate P to the language, so that we can write formulas such as 8x8y8z(P(x)^P(y)x + y = z ) P(z)), the situation becomes drastically di erent. Garfunkel encode the natural number n by a domain element with probability 1=2 n+1 .
In order to get the 1 1 lower bound, however, we need to be able to represent an additional unary predicate P over natural numbers. For this purpose, we use a slightly more complicated encoding of the natural number n as a pair of domain elements, whose probability is approximately equal and sums to 1=2 n+1 .
More precisely, let (x 1 ; x 2 ) be a formula that expresses that x 1 and x 2 are di erent domain elements but nearer in probability to each other than to any other domain element: (x 1 ; x 2 ) = def x 1 6 = x 28 y(y 6 = x 1^y 6 = x 2 ) jw z (z = x 1 ) ? w z (z = x 2 )j < jw z (z = x 1 ) ? w z (z = y)jĵ w z (z = x 1 ) ? w z (z = x 2 )j < jw z (z = x 2 ) ? w z (z = y)j):
(Clearly absolute value is expressible in our language.) The formulas 1 and 2 below guarantee that we have pairs with total probability 1=2, 1=4, 1=8, : : :. We use the pair with probability 1=2 n+1 to encode the natural number n. 1 = def 9x 1 ; x 2 ( (x 1 ; x 2 )^(w y (y = x 1 ) + w y (y = x 2 ) = 1=2)) 2 = def 8r 9x 1 ; x 2 ( (x 1 ; x 2 )^(w y (y = x 1 ) + w y (y = x 2 ) = r)) ) 9x 0 1 ; x 0 2 ( (x 0 1 ; x 0 2 )^(w y (y = x 0 1 ) + w y (y = x 0 2 ) = r=2))]:
The following formula guarantees that every domain element has positive probability; this gives us a straightforward bijection between pairs (d; d 0 ) of domain elements satisfying and the natural numbers: 3 = def 8x(w z (z = x) > 0): We next provide a translation ' ! ' t from a formula ' of Presburger arithmetic with one unary predicate P to a formula ' t of L = 1 (;). Without loss of generality, we may consider only formulas ' all of whose atomic subformulas are of the form P(x), x = 0, x = 1, and x + x 0 = y. Corresponding to each variable x that appears in ', we have the pair of variables x 1 ; x 2 in ' t . The key trick in the translation is that we encode P(n) by taking the pair of elements that encode n to have equal probability, while we encode :P(n) by taking the pair of elements that encode P(n) to have distinct prob- (w z (z = y 1 ) + (w z (z = y 2 )) (P(x)) t = (w z (z = x 1 ) = w z (z = x 2 )) (' 1^'2 ) t = ' t 1^' t 2 (:') t = :(' t ) (9x') t = 9x 1 ; x 2 ( (x 1 ; x 2 )^' t ) Finally, given a sentence of Presburger arithmetic with an additional unary predicate, let 0 = def 1^ 2^ 3^ t . It is now easy to check that is satis able (over IN) i 0 is satis able with probabilities over the rationals.
This gives the required lower bound for part (a) in Theorem 5.5.
The upper bound for (a) can be proved as in Theorem 5.2, replacing the reals with the rationals. A drop from 2 1 to 1 1 accompanies this drop in cardinality, since now all the predicates and functions are now de ned over the rationals (and hence can be viewed as being de ned over the natural numbers), rather than the reals.
The proof of (b) is essentially identical to that of (a). Suppose there is a binary predicate B in . We can force B to be an equivalence relation, and then replace all occurrences of subformulas of the form x = y by B(x; y) in the translation from to 0 . We leave details to the reader. Finally, for (c) observe that we get a 1 0 lower bound since the theory of the rationals with + and is already arithmetic (that is, 1 0 -complete) by a result of Robinson Rob49] . (The key step in Robinson's proof is showing that a predicate testing whether a number is a natural number can be de ned in this language.) For the upper bound, we use techniques similar to those of Theorem 5.1. Indeed, the proof of Claim 2 of Theorem 5.7 in Hal90] shows that, given a formula ' in L 1 ( ), where consists of only unary predicates, we can nd rst-order formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k and mutually exclusive formulas 1 ; : : :; k in the language of real closed elds such that ' is valid (given that probabilities take only rational values) i (' 1^ 1 ) _ : : :_ (' k^ k ) is valid (where 1 ; : : :; k are interpreted over the rationals). Since the validity of (' 1^ 1 ) _ : : :_ (' k^ k ) can easily be encoded by a formula of arithmetic, the upper bound follows.
The situation is analogous and worse when we move to type 2 structures. Here we get to 2 1 completeness as soon as there is even one unary predicate in the language. If equality is included as a logical symbol, then we get 1 1 completeness with only a constant symbol in . (If ' does not contain any nonlogical symbols, then ' ) (w(') = 1) is valid; thus we cannot make any nontrivial probability statements if is empty.) Theorem 5.7: If contains at least one predicate of arity greater than or equal to one then the validity problem for L 2 ( ) with respect to type 2 probability structures is 2 1 complete.
Proof: The lower-bound proof has a similar avor to that of Theorem 5.2, so we only sketch the highlights here. Suppose contains the unary predicate P. Given a 2 1 formula , we want to construct e ectively a formula 0 in L 2 (fPg) such that is satis able i 0 is satis able. As we mentioned in Section 4, in order to prove the 2 1 lower bound, it su ces to provide such an e ective translation for formulas with at most one existential third-order quanti er.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.2, we think of the domain as consisting of two components. Fix a state s; the type 1 elements are those for which (M; s) j = P(d), while the type 2 elements are those for which (M; s) j = :P(d). We associate with every domain element d the set S d of states of positive probability such that P(d) holds. We construct formulas 1 ; : : :; 4 such that if (M; s) j = 1^: : :^ 4 , then for all type 1 domain elements d, it must be the case that S d has probability one of 1=2; 1=4; 1=8; : : :. Intuitively, we take d to represent the natural number n if the probability of the set S d is 1=2 n+2 . Domain elements d such that the probability of S d is 1=2 will be used to encode a set of sets of natural numbers. (It will su ce to encode a single set of sets since we are considering only formulas with a single thirdorder existential quanti er.) The type 2 domain elements will be used to encode sets of natural numbers.
We proceed as follows. The formula 1 says that for each type 1 element d, the set S d is nonempty (so that the set of states where P(d) holds has positive probability). The formula 2 says that there exists a type 1 element d such that S d has probability 1=2. The formula 3 guarantees the existence of type 1 elements d i such that the probability of S d i is 1=2 i . 1 = def 8x(P(x) ) w(P(x)) > 0) 2 = def 9x(P(x)^w(P(x)) = 1=2) 3 = def 8x(P(x) ) 9y(P(y)^2w(P(y)) = w(P(x)))) 4 = def 8x; y(P(x)^P(y)^w(P(x)) 6 = w(P(y)) ) w(P(x)^P(y)) = 0)
We next consider the relationship between type 1 and type 2 elements.
The formula 5 forces the set S e for a type 2 domain element e to consist essentially of the union of sets S d for type 1 domain elements d. (More precisely, S e is almost identical to d2A S d , for some set A of type 1 elements.) 5 = def 8x; y(P(x)^:P(y) ) w(P(x)^P(y)) = 0 _ w(P(x)^P(y)) = w(P(x))): Informally, we can associate every type 2 element e with a binary decimal, just as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. However, in this case, we plan to use the leading bit of the decimal to tell us whether the set of natural numbers that e represents is in the set of sets that we are encoding, while the remaining elements of the decimal describe the elements of the set that e represents. Thus, the number n is in the set represented by e if there is a type 1 element d such that the probability of S d is 1=2 n+2 (thus, d represents n) and S d is essentially a subset S e (that is, S d ? S e has measure 0). The set represented by e is in the set of sets we are encoding if there is a type 1 element d such that the probability of S d is 1=2 and S d is essentially a subset of S e .
The formula 6 is the analogue of 5 in the proof of Theorem 5.2. It guarantees that, for every real number r between 0 and 1=2, there is a type 2 domain element e such that the probability of S e is either r or r + 1=2.
The complication here arises because of our use of domain elements with probability 1=2 to encode a set of sets. Just as in the proof of Theorem 5.2, the element e represents a set of natural numbers; this set is in the set of sets encoded by (the type 1 elements of probability 1=2 in) the structure i the probability of e is r + 1=2. 6 = def 8r(0 r 1=2 ) 9y(:P(y)^(w(P(y)) = r _ w(P(y)) = r + 1=2)):
The formula 7 is an analogue of 6 in Theorem 5.2; it takes care of the case where a real number encodes two possible sets of natural numbers. This will guarantee that every set of natural numbers is represented by some domain element of type 2. First we need formulas 1 , 2 , and 3 that are analogues of the formulas with the same names used in Theorem 5.2: 1 (y) = def 9x(P(x)^w(P(x)) < 1=2^w(P(x)^P(y)) > 0)9 r > 0(8x(P(x)^w(P(x)) < r ) w(P(x)^P(y)) = 0)) 2 (y) = def 9x(P(x)^w(P(x)) < 1=2^w(P(x)^P(y)) = 0)9 r > 0(8x(P(x)^w(P(x)) < r ) w(P(x)^P(y)) > 0)) 3 (y; y 0 ) = def (w(P(y)) = w(P(y 0 )) _ jw(P(y)) ? w(P(y 0 ))j = 1=2)9
x 0 (P(x 0 )^w(P(x 0 )) 6 = 1=2ŵ (P(x 0 )^P(y)) > 0^w(P(x 0 )^P(y 0 )) = 0))
Then we obtain 7 : 7 = def 8y(:P(y)^( 1 (y) _ 2 (y)) ) 9y 0 (:P(y 0 )^ 3 (y; y 0 ))):
Just as in Theorem 5.2, we need to guarantee that if two distinct type 2 elements e and e 0 represent the same set, then either both belong to the set of sets or neither does. This is the job of the following formula 8 , which is an analogue of 7 in Theorem 5.2: 8 = def 8y; y 0 (:P(y)^:P(y 0 )8 x(P(x)^w(P(x)) < 1=2 ) w(P(x)^P(y)) = w(P(x)^P(y 0 ))) ) (w(P(y)) 1=2) , (w(P(y 0 )) 1=2)):
After these preliminaries, we are ready to provide a translation ' ! ' t from a 2 1 formula ' to a L 2 (fPg) formula ' t by induction on the structure of ', starting with atomic formulas. In the translation, we treat all the variables x; X; X as object variables, and assume that the basic connectives in formulas are^, :, and 9.
(x = 0) t = w(P(x)) = 1=4] (x = 1) t = w(P(x)) = 1=8] (x + x 0 = y) t = w(P(x)) w(P(x 0 )) = 1 4 w(P(y))] (x 2 X) t = P(x)^:P(X)^ w(P(x)^P(X)) > 0] (X 2 X) t = :P(X)^P(X)^ w(P(X)^P(X )) > 0] (' 1^'2 ) t = ' t 1^' t 2 (:') t = :(' t ) (9x') t = 9x(P(x)^w(P(x)) 6 = 1=2^' t ) (9X') t = 9X(:P(X)^' t ) (9X ') t = 9X(P(X)^w(P(X)) = 1=2^' t ) Finally, let 0 be the conjunction of t and the formulas 1 ; : : :; 8 . We leave it to the reader to check that is true i t is satis able.
The upper bound is proved in essentially the same way as that of Theorem 5.2. We remark that we can get an alternative proof of the upper bound Proof: It clearly su ces to prove the lower bound for the case where consists of one constant symbol, say c. In this case, the argument is almost identical to the hardness argument in the proof of Theorem 5.3. The only di erence is that we replace formulas of the form w y (y = x) that appear in Theorem 5.3 by w(c = x). We leave details to the reader.
The upper bound also resembles the upper bound in Theorem 5.3. Again, we restrict attention to the case where contains only constant symbols, and we rst show that we can restrict attention to countable structures. The proof of Claims 3 and 4 is essentially identical to that of Claims 1 and 2, so we leave details to the reader.
Thus, we have proved that we can restrict attention to countable structures and the upper bound follows, again using techniques of Theorem 5.2.
The situation may not be quite as bleak as it looks. In many contexts, the domain is known to be of bounded size. If we restrict attention to structures of size at most N (for some xed N), then we do get decidability. ' is valid in structures of size at most N i is valid and ' i is valid in structures of size i.
The result now follows from the decidability of the theory of real closed elds and the decidability of rst-order logic in domains of xed nite size. A fortiori, the same result holds when equality is not in the language. We can also get decidability if we restrict attention to structures of size exactly N for some xed N.
On the other hand, the restriction to bounded structures is necessary.
Theorem 5.11: For all (resp., for all nonempty ) the validity problem for L = 1 ( ) (resp. L = 2 ( )) with respect to type 1 (resp. type 2) probability structures of nite size is co-r.e. complete.
Proof: Since, by Theorem 5.10, the validity problem, and hence the satisability problem, is decidable for structures of size at most N, it is easy to see that the satis ability problem is r.e. for nite domains, and hence the validity problem is co-r.e. If we have at least a binary predicate in , then the fact that the validity problem for nite structures is co-r.e. hard follows from the well-known result that it is already co-r.e. hard for rst-order logic Tra50]. (This is true even without equality in the language.) To see that the lower-bound result holds even for L = 1 (;), we use similar ideas to those used in the proof of Theorem 5.5 to show that for every formula ' in the language of Presburger arithmetic augmented by a unary predicate P, we can nd a formula ' t of L = 1 (;) such that ' t is valid in nite structures i ' is valid when interpreted over nite initial segments of the natural numbers. (That is, we interpret these formulas over the domain f1; : : :; Ng, and m + n = N holds in this interpretation if m + n > N holds over the natural numbers.) A straightforward modi cation of the proof given in Hal91] can be used to show that the validity problem for formulas in the language of Presburger arithmetic interpreted over nite initial segments of the natural numbers is co-r.e. complete; we omit details here. In this section we show that in a precise sense the formalisms we have considered are equi-expressive. That is, we can e ectively translate from L 1 to L 2 and from type 1 to type 2 structures, and vice versa, in a way that preserves satis ability and validity of formulas. These results are somewhat surprising in light of the very di erent intuitions being captured by these two approaches. They also elucidate the relationship between the logics and their complexities.
We start with a translation from L 1 to L 2 . We want to show that given a formula ' in L The idea is that we can replace subterms of ' of the form wx( ) with w( x 1 =a 1 ; : : :; x n =a n ]), where a 1 ; : : :; a n are fresh constants, as long as a 1 ; : : :; a n act like \independent random variables". Formally, given a type 2 structure M = (D; S; ; ) Let P 1 ; : : :; P k be the predicate symbols that appear in ', and let f 1 ; : : :; f m be the function symbols that appear in '. The following formulas say that the predicate symbol P gets the same interpretation at all states: 8x (:P(x)^w(P(x)) = 0) _ (P(x)^w(P(x)) = 1)]:
A similar formula achieves the same e ect for function symbols. Let fixed be the conjunction of these formulas for all the function and predicate sym- Finally, it is simple to turn a special type 2 structure into an \equiva-lent" type 1 structure: the type 1 structure has the same domain, the same interpretation of the symbols in , and gives to d the probability of the set of worlds where a 1 takes the value d. Again, we leave details to the reader.
Note that the type 2 structure M 12 constructed in the proof depends on the formula ' (in particular, it depends on the number of variables that appear in the vectorx in subformulas of ' of the form wx ). This dependence of M 12 on ' results from our requirement that the probability over the possible worlds in M 12 be discrete. We could have a uniform construction, but this would result in non-discrete probabilities over the continuum many worlds in D ! . We remark that a similar construction (resulting in a non-discrete probability) was used by Gaifman Gai64, Theorem 3].
We can also translate back from L 2 to L 1 , with a simpler approach. The intuitive idea for getting the translation in this direction is fairly straightforward, and resembles usual constructions for modal logics. Given a set of function and predicate symbols, let be the result of replacing every predicate P (resp. function f) of arity n that appears in with a predicate P (resp. function f ) of arity n + 1. Intuitively, the extra argument will range over possible worlds.
Theorem 6.2: There is an e ective translation that maps a formula ' in L 2 ( ) (resp. L Proof: Given a formula ' in L 2 , let ' 21 be the result of replacing atomic formulas such as P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) in ' by P (x 1 ; : : :; x n ; s), and replacing subterms of the form w(P(x 1 ; : : :; x n )) by w s (P (x 1 ; : : :; x n ; s)); we similarly replace a term such as f(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) that appears in with the corresponding term f (t 1 ; : : :; t n ; s). Given a type 2 probability structure M = (S; D; ; ), we consider a type 1 probability structure M 21 = (S D; 0 ; 0 ) with the following properties. The domain S D is the disjoint union of S and D. We choose 0 so that (d 1 ; : : :; d n ) 2 (s)(P) i (d 1 ; : : :; d n ; s) 2 0 (P ); similarly (s)(f)(d 1 ; : : :; d n ) = e i 0 (f )(d 1 ; : : :; d n ; s) = e. We take 0 to be such that 0 (s) = (s) (thus, 0 (d) = 0 for d 2 D). Intuitively, we have made the states part of the domain, so we can replace taking the probability over the states where P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) holds with taking the probability over the domain elements for which P (x 1 ; : : :; x n ; s) holds. It is now easy to check that M j = ' i M 
Conclusions
We have investigated complexity and expressiveness issues for two related rst-order logics of probability, where in one case we put the probability on the domain and, in the other, we put the probability on the states. We have shown that in general, the validity problem is highly intractable for both logics. All our results were proved under the assumption that the probability is discrete. It is easy to see that all our lower bounds go through (without change) if we allow arbitrary probability distributions. On the other hand, as we mentioned in the proof of Theorem 5.2, our upper-bound proofs for all the undecidability results do depend on the discreteness of the probability distribution. We conjecture that, in fact, the complexity of the logics gets even worse if we allow arbitrary probability distributions. Note that non-discrete probability distributions arise quite naturally in the context of type 2 structures (when considering an in nite sequence of coin tosses, for example).
One implication of these results is that we will not be able to nd recursive axiom systems for these logics that are sound and complete (since the existence of such an axiom system would imply that the validity problem would be r.e.). There are a few special cases where our results show that it is possible to get complete axiomatizations, for example, in the case of L 1 ( ) where consists only of unary predicates and the case where we restrict to bounded domains. In a companion paper Hal90], a sound set of axioms is provided for reasoning about probabilities over the domain and another is provided for reasoning about probabilities over possible worlds. These axioms are, in some sense, complete whenever possible. In particular, when combined with the standard axioms for reasoning about rst-order logic, the axioms for reasoning about probabilities over the domain are complete for L 1 ( ) if contains only unary predicates; when combined with axioms for equality and an axiom that says that the domain has at most N elements, the axioms are complete for L 1 ( ) if we restrict attention to domains with at most N elements.
It may very well be that for most applications we do not need the full power of rst-order logic. Perhaps there are some interesting subclasses of the language for which validity is decidable. Unfortunately, our lowerbound proofs show that it does not take much to get a language which is badly undecidable. This is an issue that deserves further investigation.
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